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INTroduCTIoN
Since the turn of the millennium the aid business has witnessed an important shift 
in the conceptualization and practice of aid delivery. The move towards harmonized and aligned 
approaches, including the need to make aid more predictable and flexible, introduced the budget 
support modality. Budget support (BS) was designed as a financing modality to support poverty 
reduction efforts, which was to be used quite selectively. Only countries with a good policy en-
vironment and a government demonstrably committed to poverty reduction were to be granted 
this flexible aid modality. Ownership was considered key because experience had shown that 
conditionality, particularly the kind that refers to reforms or policy changes which carry some 
political sensitiveness, tend to be ineffective. 
In reality a lot of donors started to channel parts of their aid through this fashion-
able new millennium flavoured aid modality without being particularly selective. As a result, aid 
predictability was put under strain almost immediately because donors started to use BS sus-
pensions as a sanctioning mechanism whenever a ‘troubling’ event in the recipient country was 
considered a (potential) ‘breach’ in the trust relation between donor and recipient. ‘Troubling’ 
events could range from corruption scandals, human rights violations or electoral fraud to 
seemingly more ‘prosaic’ onsets like the late production of a key report. Since a  number of sus-
pensions were directly linked to regime issues, BS suspensions were thus tied in with the use of 
political conditionalities and served as a stick to lever for change (Hayman 2011; Molenaers et al 
2010; Faust et al 2012). 
There is not a great deal of scientific literature that explicitly looks into the issue 
of BS suspensions as a subset of (aid) sanctions. To our knowledge no systematic review of BS 
suspensions yet exists, let alone an attempt at (quantitatively) detecting the overarching pat-
terns which determine the use of BS suspension as a sanctioning mechanism. In our attempt to 
address this research gap we drew on both the economic sanctions as well as on the aid alloca-
tion literature. Although the literature on economic sanctions and the development literature 
on budget support understandably rely on distinctive rhetoric (the language of coercion and 
power in the former, the language of partnership and political dialogue in the latter), the issues 
at stake are strikingly similar. For this reason, we are confident our work may contribute not to 
only to the debate on the logic and effectiveness of budget support, but also to the buoyant lit-
erature on economic stratecraft. Added to the economic sanctions literature and aid allocation 
studies we looked at a number of country case studies where BS suspensions have taken place, 
focusing specifically on the elements that were identified in these case studies which might help 
to explain why donors make use of suspensions. 
But why look at BS suspensions specifically and not aid suspensions more 
generally? To start with, aid suspensions, in which the donor withdraws all aid, do not occur 
that frequently. In fact, on the recipient side only gross human rights violations or coup d’états 
have pushed donors into an exit strategy1. This has in part contributed to the impression 
that donors are too lax with regards to less ‘drastic’ situations such as consistent economic 
and political underperformance on the part of recipient governments; that aid is given and 
sustained too uncritically; that donors are not committed to the values, norms and goals they 
defend so vigorously in their discourse. But prevalence is not our only concern: we feel that aid 
suspensions are too crude a proxy for studying donor behaviour, because a lot more variation 
[1]  On the donor side, a change in government preferences with regards to partner countries might also lead to an 
exit strategy. Some donors also exit when a recipient country graduates from the low income category. 
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in sanctioning behaviour is both theoretically possible and actually occurring. More specifically 
our paper shows that in the last decade donors have been extremely active in trying to sanction 
(perceived) underperformance (albeit often in a misplaced way). Corruption scandals, electoral 
fraud, human rights violations, etc have in a large number of cases been the direct trigger 
for donors to suspend BS. Looking specifically at modality suspensions, and particularly BS 
suspensions, provides a very good overview of more ‘nuanced’ forms of aid sanctioning. Where 
full aid exit often implies the end of the aid relationship, other forms of sanctioning – such as BS 
suspension –  indicate a strong signal from the donor to the recipient: it implies a breach in the 
trust relationship2, a warning to the incumbent government to address the issues at stake, an 
invitation to negotiate measures so as to correct what has been going wrong through the political 
and/or policy dialogue. Suspensions of this kind therefore go hand in hand with conditionalities, 
sometimes negotiated and consensual, which may be arrived at without reaching the public 
arena and therefore invisible to both the wider public and the research community. 
The added value of this paper thus lies in the fact that it is a very first attempt to 
quantitatively detect which variables push a donor towards (not) suspending BS in the case of 
a ‘troubling’ event in a recipient country. In order to do this, we made use of a dataset which 
captures all BS commitments in Sub-Saharan Africa during the period 2000-2008. Our dataset 
can thus be considered an unbalanced panel with donor-recipient-year combinations as units of 
observation. We added to this dataset a newly compiled variable that indicates whether a donor 
decided to suspend BS in a recipient country in a given year. This variable captures a range of 
sanctioning behaviours on the part of the donor including delaying, reducing or rechanneling BS. 
The results that arise from a ‘recipient-factors’ model – both estimated as a linear probability 
model and as a conditional fixed-effects logit model – furthermore reveal that ethnic fractionali-
zation and the share of aid that a recipient receives as budget support play an important role. A 
‘donor-factors’ model also points to colonial ties as a predictor for BS suspension.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section we review 
the literature in order to identify the variables which might influence BS suspensions. In section 
3 we review the data and elaborate on the regression model used, followed by a discussion of our 
empirical results. The final section of the paper draws some conclusions and identifies further 
avenues for research.
[2]  In a sense this a mutual breach in the trust relationship: from the recipient side donor promises of (in-year) pre-
dictable flows have fallen away, and from the donor side recipient promises of upholding given partnership principles 
have not been upheld.
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1.  lITeraTure revIew 
1.1. Economic sanctions
Inspired by the seminal work of Galtung (1967), scholars have developed a fertile re-
search programme on the logic and effects of economic sanctions. Initially, the literature mainly 
focused on whether economic sanctions would provide a viable alternative to military interven-
tion. Over time, however, the research agenda has incorporated the wide range of foreign policy 
tools that may be used as instruments of ‘economic statecraft’ (Baldwin 1985), including the 
suspension of financial aid. More recently, the literature has moved into the analysis of ‘smart 
sanctions’, consciously designed to hurt key elites rather than the target’s country mass public 
(Drezner 2011). Our work on budget support suspensions –a subtype of economic sanction in its 
own right- can be informed by and contribute to this ever growing sanctions scholarship.
Economic sanctions are often defined as ‘the deliberate, government-inspired 
withdrawal, or threat or withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations’ (Hufbauer et al. 
1990) and as with budget support suspensions they are employed in situations where a breach 
has occurred ostensibly owing to ‘troubling’ courses of action on the sactionee. In the IR jargon, 
sanctions are actions initiated ‘by one or more international actors (the ‘senders’) against one 
or more others (the ‘receivers’) with either or both of two purposes: to punish the receivers by 
depriving them of some value and/or to make the receivers comply with certain norms the send-
ers deem important’ (Galtung 1967: 379). 
Existing models of sanction imposition assume that sanctions may be imposed for 
a variety of reasons. The crucial distinction is between instrumental and expressive motives. 
The instrumental theory of sanctions contends that the main purpose of sanctions is ‘to bring 
about policy change in the target nation through imposing the severest possible economic 
harm’ (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 1988: 786). On the other hand, the expressive (often called 
symbolic) theory of sanctions suggests that ‘sanctions might have an altogether different goal 
–  namely, to serve the interests of pressure groups within the sender country’. Although these 
goals are obviously not mutually exclusive, this analytical scheme has forced researchers to be 
more explicit about the underlying politics behind the extensive use of economic sanctions. If 
the problem is framed as a bargaining game in which the sender seeks concessions from the 
target by using the sanction as leverage (Nooruddin 2002: 68), a range of economic and institu-
tional factors may exert an influence on the observed pattern of sanctions, including the degree 
of proximity and interdependence, the relative ex-ante leverage and credibility of the sender, 
the regime type of the sender and the target, the geopolitical context, the level of international 
coordination (Martin 1993; Nooruddin 2002; Lektzian and Souva 2007). 
The consolidated sanctions scholarship offers some important lessons. First and 
foremost, it underlines our commitment to constructing a dataset on budget support suspen-
sions (‘sanction episodes’) as a crucial building block for stimulating further research interest on 
the topic. Second, it further confirms that the systematic study of budget support suspensions 
really matters: in order to better understand the political logic of budget support we clearly need 
to grasp the different mechanisms and steps of this complex process. Third, empirical models of 
sanctions imposition may guide model specification, including the selection of key explanatory 
factors, complementing the ideas drawn from the aid allocation literature. Last, but not least, it 
stresses the value of combining large-N and case studies. Quantitative analysis is key for docu-
menting general patterns and average effects; in turn, case studies go deeper into the causal 
mechanisms (complexity) at work and capture the nuances of strategic interaction.   
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1.2.  Aid Allocation and modality selectivity 
Aid allocation studies produce insights on donor motivations in providing aid. As 
we explain briefly below, the elements that motivate a donor to provide aid might also in part in-
fluence the withdrawal of (parts of) that aid and for this reason it is important to consider these 
variables in our model.   
Allocation, which refers to country choice and aid volumes, is influenced by both 
donor interests (DI) and recipient needs (RN). Donor interests refer to trade and commercial inter-
ests, historical factors such as colonial ties, and strategic concerns. Recipient needs (RN) relate 
to factors such as poverty levels. DIs have surfaced prominently as a determining factor in ex-
plaining aid allocation (e.g., Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Berthelemy, 2006). Features of the recipient 
country also influence a donor’s decision to give (more) aid: the World Bank’s ‘Assessing Aid’ for 
instance proved influential in getting donors to take on board the idea that aid is more effective 
in good policy environments (World Bank, 1998; Burnside & Dollar, 2000; Collier & Dollar, 2002)3. 
Clist et al. (2011) argue that the quality of recipient policy is of particular importance 
in understanding the choice of aid modality. They argue that BS, when given unconditionally, is 
the most flexible form of aid because once disbursed the donor has little to no control over its 
use. One would thus expect that when donors perceive the recipient to have better policies, they 
would grant a larger proportion of their aid in the form of BS. The study by Clist et al (2011) looks 
into the selectivity criteria for BS for the EC and WB and comes to the conclusion that indeed 
governments with better public expenditure monitoring, allocation mechanisms and better ser-
vice delivery receive more budget support. A mapping carried out by the European Commission 
(2010) also shows that a number of bilateral donors consider political regime aspects before 
granting BS. The quality of the partnership and the quality of the policy dialogue with the recipi-
ent government is also considered an important condition for granting BS by some donors. 
All the elements that influence the choice of channeling money through BS, might 
also inform/influence the suspension decision. A ‘troubling’ event can for example trigger the 
perception/idea that the recipient might no longer4 conform to the standards/benchmarks 
which served as entry points to granting BS in the first place , causing the donor to suspend BS. 
For this reason our model takes up the key variables identified in the allocation literature. 
One such variable is governance quality. We would expect this to influence not only 
BS allocation decisions but also suspension decisions because the jointly signed Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU) contains a number of ‘Underlying Principles’ to which the recipient 
‘contractually5’ commits when signing it. These underlying principles refer to the upholding of 
the principles of good governance, which includes a range of ‘variables’ such as open and free 
elections, respect for human rights, control of corruption, etc… Of course, when an event takes 
place which could be interpreted as a ‘breach’ of these underlying principles, donors can, and 
frequently do, decide to withdraw (part of) their BS.   
[3]  The scholarly debate on whether the quality of recipient policies has driven donors to become more selective 
remains a debate (eg Hout 2007a, 2007b; Nunnenkamp & Thiele 2006; Clist 2011). 
[4]  If indeed it ever did (see IOB 2012 for a discussion of the (lack of) strictness regarding the selectivity criteria for 
BS)
[5]  The MoU is of course not a legally binding contract.
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1.3.  Digging deeper: reviewing some case studies
We have selected four cases where several BS suspensions have taken place; where 
at least one of the ‘troubling’ events was related to political regime issues (human rights, elec-
tions); and where qualitative studies on these suspensions are readily available. We build on 
these country studies to further identify variables which need to be taken up to complete our 
model. 
1.3.1. Ethiopia 
The 2005 parliamentary elections in Ethiopia were the most contested ever. 
Although the 2005 elections were preceded by openness and a vibrant political debate, which 
were interpreted as signals of a bright democratic future for Ethiopia, they ended in sharp disa-
greement and fierce repression. Dozens of people got killed, thousands were arrested (Abbink 
2006; Dom & Gordon 2011). This regress into authoritarian tendencies provoked a reaction from 
the donor community. The EU and US, both the dominant donors, initiated diplomatic talks but 
gave mixed signals. The EU made some sharply critical statements, while the US remained more 
cautious in condemning the electoral process. DFID responded to the incident by cancelling a 
planned increase in budget support, diverting £20 million to other channels (DFID 2010). The 
political crisis in the aftermath of the 2005 elections led to a strong joint statement by the donor 
group known as the DAG6 saying that it was collectively reviewing development cooperation 
modalities to Ethiopia because of the direction the events had taken (Lyons cited in Borchgrevink 
2008). It was further reported that donors planned to withhold USD 375 million earmarked BS 
to Ethiopia. The BS donors included WB, EU, AfDB, UK, Canada, Ireland, Germany and Sweden. 
The amount that was going to be withdrawn equalled 20% of the aid Ethiopia had received in 
2004. In early 2006 the DAG took steps and commissioned a group of experts to assess the situ-
ation and draw out possible scenarios for donors to follow. Although this looked like coordi-
nated action towards formulating political conditionalities, in reality donors did not withhold 
funds but instead started reallocating them to other programmes with stricter earmarking and 
monitoring (Borchgrevink 2008:211; Hackenesch 2011; DAG 2005). One of those programmes was 
the Protection of Basic Services (PBS), which enables resources to continue to flow to the public 
sector in the form of federal–regional block grants but over which donors have intense scrutiny. 
The resulting Protecting Basic Services Programme was a hybrid instrument, effectively sector 
budget support earmarked to service delivery under the functional mandates of subnational 
governments. The US (not a BS donor) did not join in with this and their aid package remained 
unchanged. So notwithstanding strong language on the part of the DAG in December 2005, the 
conditionalities were watered down and in fact eventually abandoned in the course of the first 
half of 2006 (Borchgrevink 2008:206-212). By 2010 none of the initial BS donors had returned to 
granting BS. The PBS donors vary in how they present this modality to their home constituency/
board7: PBS is considered a project modality for the WB and EC; budget support for the AfDB; 
budget support ‘with a difference’ for DFID) (Dom & Gordon 2011).
Donors thus reacted in very different ways to the crisis/breach and this implies that 
the various elements or dimensions which influence individual decisions are multiple and weigh 
differently for different donors, meaning we wouldn’t expect a model quantitatively measur-
ing the effects of these various elements on the likelihood of suspension to necessarily come 
[6] The Development Assistance Group has existed since 2000 and is linked to PRSP processes.
[7] Which is especially interesting when looking at suspension from the perspective of their ‘expressive/symbolic’ 
value
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up with a very large number of consistently significant factors. Ethiopia is not only a country in 
democratic regress it is also a large country, with a huge (poor) population, a perceived success 
story in terms of poverty reduction, growth and reform, an important ally in the war on terror 
and a factor of stability in the Horn of Africa. All these variables influence  donor willingness/re-
luctance to interfere with political governance issues (Aalen & Tronvol 2008:19; Furtado & Smith 
2007: 8, 24; de Renzio 2006). Borchgrevink (2008) states that the donors who shifted their un-
tied BS to the PBS programme saw this as a means to achieve objectives: to maintain support 
to needy sectors and to have continued engagement (policy dialogue) with the government on 
the one hand and to establish ways of entering into closer dialogue with Ethiopia on govern-
ance issues and to directly induce governance reform on the other. In this sense it was seen as a 
more sophisticated response than the blunt conditionality of withholding aid and could thus be 
considered to constitute a ‘smart’ sanction. PBS opened new forums for more unified and less 
fragmented policy dialogue (Furtado & Smith 2007). Added to this, although Ethiopia is an aid 
dependent country, which might lead one to expect a higher sensitivity toward ‘obeying’ donor 
conditionalities, Borchgrevink (2008) argues that the Ethiopian government has been adept at 
managing relations with donors in order to minimise their influence. This has been achieved 
by by for instance inviting new donors (China) to divide and rule and also by, when going gets 
tough, accepting aid cuts. Donors are aware of their limited influence, but nonetheless they con-
tinue to use sanctioning mechanisms to which they then attach conditionalities due the impor-
tance of soothing public opinion in the donor country. (Borchgrevink 2008:217). 
1.3.2. Rwanda
The Rwandan government has been accused of repressing the opposition and a re-
cent UN report claims that its involvement in DRC (via its alleged support of the M23 military 
group) destabilizes the region. The Budget Support Harmonisation Group (BSHG) has existed 
since 2003, but since 2004 the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and the UK have been cancelling 
or delaying BS while also shifting from one modality to the other. Sweden completely stopped 
providing BS from 2008 onwards. Up until 2012 (check) members of this group were the UK, EU, 
Germany, WB, the Netherlands, Belgium, AFDB. The US and the UK are the largest bilateral do-
nor. Though the US doesn’t provide BS, it is considering to do so. The UK, as a BS donor, is being 
put under heavy pressure to not continue with BS support to Rwanda. 
The political situation in the country itself as well as the regional role of Rwanda 
has led to divergent reactions within the donor group to various high profile events. Beswick 
(2011:1922) argues that the country succeeded in ‘breaking’ the coalition of the ‘likeminded’ (also 
referred to as the Nordic+) in that the UK position has been fundamentally different from the 
Netherlands and Sweden. The latter two countries have given more weight to political govern-
ance concerns, while the UK has long not wanted to cut aid in order to retain some degree of in-
fluence over Rwanda’s overall trajectory (Beswick 2011:1923). It has previously been argued that 
coordination is easier for the likeminded donors given the similarities in their preferences and 
priorities, but this case study demonstrates that such a coalition in fact easily falls apart when 
the going gets tough. Nonetheless, the Nordic+ factor might be relevant so we will include it in 
our model. 
In line with the Ethiopian case, Rwanda displays the features of an excellent per-
former in terms of poverty reduction, growth and reform (Beswick 2011; Schmidt 2011), while on 
the democraty front, and from a regional perspective, large doubts are expressed with regards 
to the regime’s intentions. An important difference with Ethiopia is that Rwanda was long con-
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sidered as a fragile and conflict-affected country. Post genocide Rwanda introduced a rift be-
tween donors. The ‘old traditional donors’ (Belgium and France) were more distrustful towards 
the regime, while ‘new’ donors (the UK and the Netherlands) stepped in with larger aid volumes 
supporting the government in power. Flexible aid was seen as a means to consolidate the regime 
(supporting political stability) in order to prevent the country from slipping back into conflict. 
Particularly the UK became a ‘critical friend’ – it saw support to Rwanda as part of the post 9/11 
war on terror in that building peaceful societies and preventing conflict contributes to inter-
national security. At the same time, however, Rwanda’s involvement in DRC is considered by 
some donors to be a source of further destabilization of the region (UN report). There Rwanda 
is thus both a (developmental) ‘success’ on the one hand, and, on the other, a country with au-
thoritarian tendencies which appears to be negatively affecting regional stability (Beswick 2011). 
Similarly to the Ethiopia case, suspending BS in a country like Rwanda which has consistently 
received a very significant proportion of its aid in this form thus forces donors to make difficult 
choices: between ignoring democratic transgressions for the sake of continued success in the 
area of poverty reduction and disregarding developmental success due to unsavoury political 
actions on the part of the recipient8. This illuminates, as many donors no doubt realize when de-
ciding whether or not to suspend, the fact BS suspensions run the danger of ‘throwing the baby 
out with the bathwater’ and are therefore not a sufficiently ‘smart’ sanctioning mechanism.  
1.3.3. Malawi 
Ever since the era of one-party rule, Malawi’s relationship with the donor commu-
nity has proved erratic and contentious (Resnick 2012). The fallout between President Mutharika 
and the international community, which escalated in 2010 and reached a breaking point in 2011, 
is the latest of these episodes. By July 2011, all major donors had effectively suspended budget 
support to Malawi due to concerns over economic management, governance, and human rights 
(DFID 2012).  
The issue that broke the proverbial camel’s back related to amendment of Malawi’s 
Penal Code (December 2010). It implied further criminalization of homosexuality (extending it 
to women) and the deepening of measures aimed at repressing the opposition and silencing 
internal dissent (including a tighter control over the media). A group of major donors (includ-
ing France, Germany, Japan, Iceland, Ireland, the US, and the UK) expressed ‘concern’ with the 
deterioration of human rights (Resnick 2011: 17). In reaction, and as has also been the case in 
other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa in similar positions, the government played the national-
ist card: ‘Africa will be developed by Africans’. In turn, the international community remained 
divided and even confused. Germany’s early reactions over revisions of the Penal Code were not 
initially accompanied by other CABS (Common Approach to BS) donors, not least because the 
types of conditionality attached to disbursement decisions varied substantially. Whereas the 
UK, Norway and Germany explicitly stated that human rights, good governance and democratic 
principles should be upheld, the EU, the IMF, the World Bank and the AfDB put the emphasis 
on sound public financial management and compliance with economic and social policy tar-
gets. By mid 2011, the IMF decided pulled the plug, suspending the outstanding Extended Credit 
Facility (ECF) programme. This triggered a chain of suspensions from all other members of the 
CABS group. On 14 July 2011, the UK International Development Secretary, Andrew Mitchell, an-
nounced that Malawi would no longer receive general budget support from the UK, the largest 
donor and key diplomatic player. As always, Britain did not close the political dialogue door. As 
[8]  The Tinbergen-rule remains an impossible-to-cope-with-hurdle for most donors. 
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Mitchell stated: ‘I remain willing to reconsider our approach as and when our concerns are ad-
dressed’. 
The sudden death of President Mutharika in 2012 and the coming into power of 
Joyce Banda led to a renewal of international aid commitments. Britain and Malawi relaunched 
their development partnership and Mitchell made a high level visit to renew Britain’s deep com-
mitment to Malawi (DfID 2012a, DFiD 2012b). 
Which potentially noteworthy variables emerge from the Malawian case? Malawi is 
one of the world’s poorest economies, ranking 171 out of 187 in the Human Development Index. 
Although some progress has been observed in some indicators over the last decade (e.g. infant 
mortality, HIV treatment, access to water and sanitation), the development situation remains 
extremely fragile, as very rapid population growth puts severe stress on agriculture and food 
prices (DFID 2013). In this context the country is highly dependent on international support. As 
for the political situation, the record is mixed. On the positive side, the country made a decisive 
transition to multiparty democracy in 1990 and is relatively free of conflict (at least in compari-
son with its regional neighbors). On the negative side, entrenched patrimonialism and weak 
democratic accountability are still the rule, mainly at local level. From the donor perspective, it 
is evident that the international community in general and the UK in particular face incentives 
for ‘selling’ Malawi as a development success story in the region, not least because donors have 
been heavily involved in the country for a long period of time. The ‘expressive’ aspect of sanc-
tions in that sense work in the opposite direction here: donors refrain from employing them not 
because of external lobbies but because they themselves do not want to ‘lose face’ and be seen 
as having made a poor choice of partner country. Here they are in sense caught in a kind of ‘cred-
ibility catch-22’: either they are vocal about the ‘troubling’ behavior of the recipient in order to 
maintain the credibility to be gained by acting in a ‘principled’ manner by consistently punishing 
transgressions (which simultaneously potentially causes them to lose credibility in terms how 
rigorous their selectivity policy was), or they gloss over transgressions in order to show that 
they were justified in their trust in recipients (and modalities) which tarnishes the record of their 
credibility but showing that they were badly mistaken.
How can we explain the breakdown of cooperation in 2011? Two key factors might 
have offered Mutharika greater leverage to resist the demands of donors (Resnick 2012). First, 
the increasing availability of alternative sources of external support, most notably from China, 
but also from India, Iran and other Arab donors. Second, the recent discovery of uranium, which 
could have relaxed the perceived budget constraints. As for the strategies of international part-
ners, lack of coordination has (once again) been an issue, undermining the credibility of succes-
sive threats. On the other hand, we don’t know whether a more decisive early response from 
donors would have brought about cooperation or simply precipitated the crisis. 
1.3.4. Uganda 
Having previously come under fire from donors for what they felt to be its excessive 
military expenditure, Uganda once again saw portions of its budget support withdrawn in the 
run-up to the 2006 general elections when the incumbent Yoweri Museveni not only modified 
the constitution to enable him to run for a third term, but also imprisoned Forum for Democratic 
Change’s Kizza Besigye, the leading opposition candidate. The political pluralism donors had 
been pushing for9 (for these were to be the first multi-party elections since Museveni took of-
fice in 1986) was thus not materializing in the desired shape, and Museveni was clearly using 
[9]  Albeit in a fairly sotto voce fashion (Makara et al 2007)
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his power to mitigate the effects of the political insecurity brought on by this ostensible step 
towards deepening democratization (Cammack 2007).
Most major budget support donors signaled their disapproval of these develop-
ments by withdrawing part of their committed funds and arranging for these to be rechanneled 
to modalities less associated with regime endorsement, such as sector or humanitarian assis-
tance. These included Norway, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK (DfID 2005). The 
European Commission instead attempted to exert influence via one of the non-financial aspects 
of budget support, persevering with political dialogue and entering into Article 8 consultations 
as set out in the Cotonou Agreement (Hayman 2011). 
The donor-side variables of interest in the Uganda case include colonial ties in that 
Uganda’s largest and ‘lead’ bilateral donor is DfID (which is second only to the World Bank in 
terms of the size of its contributions) and indeed, as subsequent incidents of suspensions have 
also borne out, Uganda’s former colonizer (and until very recently10 its largest trading partner) 
has not allowed this ‘proximity’ to make it more cautious than other donors in suspending budg-
et support (although the aforementioned factors arguably do make a complete exit from the 
modality less likely, with ‘lower cost’ strategies such as redirecting funds remaining the pre-
ferred route). While the UK may have initially stuck more closely to the BS design principles of 
predictability and a narrower poverty-focus, this appears to be changing. The mainstream UK 
media, across the political spectrum, has certainly not shied away from highlighting revelations 
of high-level corruption in Uganda that other donors have also reacted to. However, the effects 
of this visibility in the media (which applies to a similar degree to both past and ongoing devel-
opments in Malawi and Rwanda) are difficult to quantify. What has been convincingly argued 
though is that Uganda’s status as aid darling (De Renzio 2006) and quasi-poster boy for GBS 
(Fisher 201111) may have meant that in earlier years (as was argued in the case of Malawi) donors’ 
reputational investment in seeing it succeed insulated it from criticisms for transgressions other 
GBS recipients were taken to task on. However this has simultaneously and for the same reason 
made it instrumental in the loss of popularity of the instrument as a whole in countries such as 
the Netherlands, where a subsequent shift to the right in the government there has further in-
creased skepticism about the appropriateness of BS in contexts, such as that of Uganda, where 
major governance concerns persist (IOB, 2012). 
Recipient-side factors which we would expect to have played a role in suspension 
decisions include the fact that Uganda is a fairly populous country which remains largely impov-
erished, with a poverty headcount ratio of well over one third of the total population (Word Bank 
2009). While certainly aid dependent, as the example of the conversion to multi-partyism briefly 
cited earlier illustrates, Uganda carefully negotiates the political conditionalities donors subject 
it to and frequently succeeds in managing to satisfactorily appear as having acquiesced to them 
– but only as long as this can be achieved without compromising its current leadership’s hold on 
power (for a similar argument related to lack of progress on tackling corruption, see Tangri and 
Mwenda 2006). 
[10]  It was overtaken by China in 2011 (BBC 2012)
[11]  Citation permission pending
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2. empIrICal parT
Table 1: descriptive statistics
In the period 2000-2008 we have identified 27 ‘troubling’ events in SSA which trig-
gered donors to suspend BS. Of these, 11 were directly linked to political issues such as elec-
tions and human rights concerns while about 7 were linked to corruption cases. The table below 
shows the number and share of suspensions per donor and also which countries have expe-
rienced BS suspensions (again number of suspensions and share). DFID/UK is the donor that 
has suspended most frequently, followed by the Netherlands, the World Bank and Sweden. In 
Tanzania, three events triggered not less than 17 suspensions of which the bulk is situated with 
the large corruption scandal in 2008. In Ethiopia the identified suspensions were mainly linked 
to the 2005 elections. The frequent use of BS suspensions does seem to suggest a critique to-
wards the idea that donor threats are not credible12. 
Table 2 below summarizes the variables we identified and the dataset sources.
[12]  Credibility does not mean that donors have been consistent, but the fact that they have suspended does make 
threats to sanction a lot more credible.
Donor n° of suspen-sions
Share of sus-
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Table 2: variables and datasets
Variable name Description Source
Suspension Dummy coded 1 if donor i suspended budget 
support in recipient country j at year t
Authors’ own calculation
Nordic Plus Dummy coded 1 if donor is a member of the 
likeminded donors (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, 
Norway, United Kingdom, Ireland, The 
Netherlands)
Authors’ own calculation
Colonial tie Dummy coded 1 if there exists a colonial tie be-
tween donor and recipient 
IRIS
Pub. support for Aid Index of public support for aid Knack (2012)
D GDP growth Donor annual GDP growth (in %) World Development Indicators (WDI)
D aid share at t-1 Donor i’s share in the total amount of aid recipi-
ent j receives at year t-1
Based on CRS 
Number of BS donors Number of budget support donors present in the 
recipient country
Authors’ own calculation based on 
AidData
D gov. ideology 3-point variable for ideology of executive party in 
donor country
Beck et al. (2001)
democracy Dummy coded 1 if recipient country j is considered 
a democracy 
Cheibub et al. (2010)
Trans to auto. Dummy coded 1 if recipient country j transitioned 
to an autocracy 
Cheibub et al. (2010)
Ethnic frac. Index of ethnic fractionalization Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) 
Trend in corruption Difference between control of corruption at time 
t-1 and control of corruption at time t
Based on World Governance Indicators
Trend in conflict Difference between internal conflict at time t-1 
and internal conflict at time t
Based  on International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG)
Trend in bur. qual. Difference between bureaucratic quality at time 
t-1 and bureaucratic quality at time t
Based on ICRG
Trend in pol. stab. Difference between political stability at time t-1 
and political stability at time t
Based on Beck et al. (2001)
Aid over GNI at t-1 Total aid disbursed over GNI at year t-1 Based on CRS and WDI
Share of BS at t-1 Share of aid as budget support at year t-1 Based on CRS and Aiddata
log of R GDP/cap Logarithm of recipient country GDP per capita WDI
log of R population Logarithm of recipient country population WDI
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2.1. Data and model 
In order to examine which donor and recipient factors determine the suspension of 
budget support in Sub-Saharan Africa, we have estimated the following  equation:
where suspensionijt is coded 1 if donor i decides to suspend budget support in re-
cipient country j at year t. The option to use a dummy for a BS suspension is in a sense quite 
crude. The case studies clearly showed that the term BS suspension can cover a wide range of 
actions. It can mean that a donor decides to stop with this aid modality in a given country, for 
an indefinite period of time, but it can also mean that that (a part of) BS is rechanneled to other 
modalities. It can mean that a donor decides to (drastically) reduce its BS envelope, or that BS 
disbursements are delayed. Ideally the codeification of the dependent variable should reflect 
this variety of strategies including a diversification in terms of suspended volumes and the dura-
tion of the suspension. At this stage of our research however we have not been able to capture 
such detailed data and indeed it may not turn out to be readily available for each observation. 
The gathering of the data on BS suspensions has in itself posed a substantial challenge in this 
respect. It contains information that was gleaned from online news bulletins, donor reports and 
peer-reviewed articles but many of the sources do not go into a great deal of detail on the specif-
ics of the event and indeed, it is not unlikely that there may be a number of suspensions that we 
have not encoded because our search has not yet been exhaustive enough. Another important 
caveat related to the completeness and representativenss of our dataset is that since we only 
have been able to capture the actions of those donors that have publicly reported on their BS 
suspensions, our results might be biased towards the more transparent donors.13 However, part 
of our future research agenda includes looking more closely into this issue. Due to data limita-
tions we were also not able to include a number of potentially interesting covariates (such as the 
quality of policy dialogue). Nonetheless, our current model already includes an extensive set of 
regressors: a dummy for likeminded donors and – in an attempt to approximate the importance 
of home constituencies –  an index for public support for aid in the donor country as donor vary-
ing regressor Xi ; ethnic fractionalization as a recipient varying regressor Xj ; a dummy coded 1 if 
a colonial tie exists between donor i and recipient j (Xij); donor government ideology and donor 
economic growth as regressors that vary by donor and year (Xit); the total number of budget 
support donors, a dummy for democracy14, a dummy for transition to autocracy, the logarithm 
of population and GDP per capita, the trend in bureaucratic quality, political stability, internal 
conflict and control of corruption as regressors that vary by recipient and year but are donor-
invariant (Xjt); aid over GNI and share of aid as budget support a recipient receives (Xjt-1), both 
lagged one year to address reverse causality concerns; donor i’s share in the total amount of aid 
recipient j receives at year t, lagged one year for reasons of reverse causality (X
ijt-1
); and finally 
year fixed-effects (Yt). Variable definitions, sources and descriptive statistics can be found in the 
Appendix.
We began by estimating equation 3.1 as a linear probability model, correcting 
standard errors for non-independence within donor-recipient clusters. Coefficient estimates 
[13]  A potential donor transparency bias is of less concern for our ‘recipient-factors’ model as we explain BS suspen-
sions in terms of variation of recipient-country variables.
[14]  To refine the model we should use a variable that allows for more variation so as to better represent the quality 
of democracy in recipient countries.
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were obtained using 354 observations covering the years 2003 through 2007. Note that all mul-
tilateral observations are dropped from this estimation as a number of the included donor vari-
ables do not exist for multilaterals (e.g. donor economic growth).  Next, we have also estimated 
two separate models, one focusing on recipient-country variables and a second focusing on 
donor-country variables. In the former model we replaced all donor-related variables by do-
nor-fixed effects. We estimated the ‘recipient-factors’ model both as a linear probability model 
and as a conditional fixed-effects logistic regression. The coefficients of the linear probability 
model were obtained using 572 observations covering the years 2003-2007. The coefficients of 
the logistic model were obtained using 370 observations, also for the years 2003 through 2007. 
In the ‘donor-factors’ model we replaced all recipient and recipient-year varying covariates by 
recipient-fixed effects. Again we estimated a linear probability model that contained 587 obser-
vations for the period 2001-2007 and a logistic model that contained 270 observations, also for 
the period 2001-2007. In the next subsection we discuss our empirical findings.
2.2. Empirical findings
Empirical results are presented in table 1. Equation 1 shows the findings of the 
base model and indicates that budget support suspensions are positively related the number of 
budget support donors present in the recipient country. A number of explanations come to mind 
here. Since visibility of donors remains a concern (Birdsall 2005) and because BS as a modality 
makes attribution (and therefore visibility) very difficult to demonstrate a larger group of BS 
renders most donors, particularly the smaller ones, invisible. Taking a strong stand when things 
go wrong in a recipient country, however, provides them with an opportunity to raise their vis-
ibility (vis-à-vis the recipient, but also toward home constituencies). Again, given that a num-
ber of suspensions are just ‘delays’ this ‘symbolic’ act may indeed increase visibility. Another 
explanation is that donors react individually because larger BS groups have larger collective 
action problems (Knack & Smets 2012). The tendency there is to agree on the lowest common 
denominator, but it is precisely when confronted with clear breaches that some donors might 
feel compelled to make a clear statement by suspending BS. Another explanation relates to the 
‘relative’ damage an individual donor can cause: reducing BS on a large scale can undermine 
public sector functioning and the realization of development outcomes. As such it might make 
sense for a donor to suspend BS if they are only one of a large number of BS donors (depending 
of course on their share of total BS), because one can clearly signal a concern, without damaging 
developmental and reform achievements made so far. 
Equation 1, table 1 also indicates that deteriorations in control of corruption incite 
donors to suspend budget support as the coefficient on trend in corruption comes in signifi-
cantly positive at the 1% level. Given the fiduciary and reputational risk BS entails (Koeberle et al 
2006) the significance of this variable makes intuitive sense. What is interesting however is that 
the immediate trigger which led to the suspension of BS is not always linked to corruption. This 
suggests that donor frustrations with a recipient build up and result in a suspension whenever a 
crisis event (also not linked to corruption) allows them to rethink the modality. 
The linear probability model with donor and recipient variables also indicates that 
countries receiving a higher share of aid (over GNI) are faced less, on average, with BS suspen-
sions. In theory this finding might actually not be related to BS as more aid dependent countries 
might get aid through non-BS modalities. On the other hand, if these countries do get BS, a 
possible explanation for less suspensions is that their public sector/economy is more vulnerable 
and thus suffer more damage if donors withdraw BS and donors take this into account. Or it is 
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also possible that BS suspensions are less prominent because governments anticipate possible 
sanctions and do their utmost to avoid them, either by sticking faithfully to the underlying prin-
ciples or by using other diplomatic tools of persuasion. It is possible that it doesn’t always come 
so far as an actual suspension because the mere threat of a suspension might in some cases 
influence government behavior in the direction desired by donors. More research on the use of 
threats could shed light on this. 
Finally, in larger countries suspensions are more likely as the coefficient on log of 
population comes in significantly positive. Again, the pressure for achieving poverty reduction 
and pushing the government towards more performance might influence the donor reaction to 
suspend. 
Equations 2 and 3 of table 1 present the results of the recipient-factors model. 
Generally, results on control of corruption, aid dependence and population are confirmed by 
these models.15 Furthermore, equations 2 and 3 indicate that ethnically fractionalized countries 
and countries with a higher share of budget support relative to their total aid are more likely 
to face BS suspensions. How might we  explain this? Ethnic fractionalization might be related 
to a higher likelihood of widespreadpolitical tensions (without necessarily increasing political 
instability) and political controversies, which in turn might influence donors to take up certain 
positions and use BS suspensions to convince the incumbent government to change its attitude. 
A higher share of BS in the total aid package might push BS suspensions because donors try 
to increase their leverage. The more BS is given, the more leverage donors assume they have, 
hence the more they would want to use that leverage. 
Finally, equations 4 and 5 of table 1 show the empirical findings of the donor-factors 
model. Both the linear probability model and the logistic regression confirm that the number of 
budget support donors matters for BS suspensions. We also find evidence that colonial ties are 
related to budget support suspensions, as its coefficient comes in significantly positive in both 
equations 4 and 5. The colonial tie variable has been identified as a major important dimen-
sion in allocation studies (Berthelemy 2006). Ex-colonies get more aid than countries that were 
not colonized, but it is an extremely interesting finding that donor countries also suspend BS 
more easily in their former colonies. This might be in line with the economic sanctions literature 
finding that ex-colonial powers use the suspension for expressive purposes, because donor home 
constituencies are more sensitive towards events in former colonies, and therefore donor gov-
ernments react more forcefully to those events (to lower pressure from interest groups). This is 
what Clist (2011) would refer to as the proximity variable coming in. Future research might want 
to try and disentangle, the expressive dimensions of the colonial tie variable. We suspect this 
can be done by looking into (lagged) media-coverage of development cooperation issues in a 
donor country in t-1 so as to avoid reverse causality. Since we included the share of aid a donor 
contributes to the total amount a recipient receives, we control for the (financial) leverage colo-
nial powers might have.
[15]  In equation 3, the coefficient on corruption is marginally significant at the 10% level, with a p-value of 0.102.
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Table 1: Empirical results
variation base model recipient LPM recipient logit donor LPM donor logit
equation (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nordic Plus 0.0086 . . 0.0237 0.5790   
[0.0371] [0.0292] [0.5060]   
colonial tie 0.0762 . . 0.0727** 1.4520*  
[0.0670] [0.0352] [0.7563]   
public support for aid -0.0110 . . -0.0057 -0.3501   
[0.0168] [0.0140] [0.4683]   
GDP growth (annual %) 0.0156 . . 0.0127 0.1210   
[0.0148] [0.0106] [0.1539]   
Donor aid share at t-1 0.1922 . . 0.0376 2.3546
[0.2915] [0.1448] [3.7426]   
number of BS donors 0.0144*** . . 0.0397*** 0.5038***
[0.0040] [0.0071] [0.1106]   
Chief Executive Party Orientation 0.0252 . . 0.0029 0.1563   
[0.0213] [0.0143] [0.2784]   
 democracy 0.0210 -0.0227 -0.1363 . .
[0.0336] [0.0214] [0.6312]                
 transition to dictatorship 0.1320 0.0282 0.9679 . .
[0.0978] [0.0568] [11799]                
ethnic fractionalization 0.0796 0.1221*** 5.3932** . .
[0.0963] [0.0465] [2.3885]                
 trend in control of corruption 0.2504*** 0.1698*** 3.872 . .
[0.0957] [0.0592] [2.3660]                
 trend in internal conflict 0.0140 0.0117 0.4367 . .
[0.0279] [0.0168] [0.4560]                
 trend in bureaucratic quality -0.0696 -0.0492 -0.2440 . .
[0.0830] [0.0838] [4.4288]                
 trend in political stability -0.0670 -0.0187 -1.3849 . .
[0.0439] [0.0370] [1.5548]                
aid over GNI at t-1 -0.3433* -0.3461** -10.2029* . .
[0.1948] [0.1547] [5.6841]                
share of aid in R as BS at t-1 0.1841 0.2374* 11.5836*** . .
[0.1629] [0.1279] [3.9127]                
log of recipient GDP per capita (PPP) -0.0110 -0.0391*** -1.0249 . .
[0.0203] [0.0147] [0.7619]                
log of recipient population 0.0469** 0.0384*** 0.8036** . .
[0.0214] [0.0119] [0.4060]                
year-fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
country-fixed effects no yes yes yes yes
Observations 354 572 370 587 270
R squared 0.2031 0.2334 - 0.2954 -
Dependent variable is a dummy coded 1 if donor i suspended budget support in recipient country j at year t. The standard errors for the OLS 
models are adjusted for non-independence within both donor and recipient clusters. The standard errors for the conditional logit models are 
based on the observed information matrix. Constant not reported.  Significance levels:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05 and * p<0.10
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3. dISCuSSIoN
This paper constitutes a very first attempt to quantitatively weigh the determi-
nants of BS suspensions. The good news is that such a measurement is actually possible and 
that interesting findings surface from the regression exercises. Although the model still needs 
refinement and some robustness tests still need to be conducted, the results that emerge do 
provide interesting food for thought. 
Most of the studies referring to BS suspensions highlight the complex nature of 
what drives donor decisions. Our research findings point in a similar direction although a number 
of variables consistently come out as most important: number of BS donors is a strong  predic-
tor for BS suspensions; population size, ethnic fractionalization and share of BS in aid, including 
the importance of colonial ties. More aid dependent countries however tend to experience fewer 
suspensions. The expected link with recipient policies has not come out that strongly, although 
corruption does seem to further influence a donor to suspend BS. Using alternative measures for 
policies might still nuance this finding, so additional tests have to be done at this level.
The findings of our research also give rise to a significant number of interesting new 
research questions. These include the fact that  our dependent variable could be refined taking 
into account the different suspension strategies so as to better detect which elements drive a 
delay (and its duration), a rechanneling (how much control is the recipient compelled to give up), 
a full or partial abandonment of BS. It would also be interesting to have better data on the pres-
sure of home constituencies and how they feel/think about BS and conditionalities; the relation-
ship between media-coverage and suspensions. This would shed more light on the expressive 
dimension of BS suspensions. Another fruitful research topic would reconstruct the dynamics 
between BS suspension ‘leaders’ and ‘followers’, or the so called bandwagon or domino-effect. 
Are colonial powers the leaders in suspending? Are they the first ones to suspend? Finally, it 
might be interesting to deepen the study between the nature of the event/breach that triggered 
the political crisis and how that relates to the variables that prove significant.
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4. appeNdIx
descriptive statistics base model
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
suspension 0,087571 0,2830695 0 1
Nordic Plus 0,483051 0,50042 0 1
colonial tie 0,180791 0,3853896 0 1
public support for aid 0,131714 0,7220007 -1,49068 1,995191
Donor growth 2,174162 1,734266 -3 6,37326
Donor aid share in recipient at t-1 0,056595 0,0756342 0 0,571734
number of BS donors 7,437853 4,478192 1 17
Donor gov. Ideology 1,799435 0,9075695 1 3
Recipient democracy 0,338983 0,4740341 0 1
transition to autocracy 0,00565 0,0750581 0 1
ethnic fractionalization 0,795647 0,1474233 0,05 0,959
trend in control of corruption -0,01237 0,1366288 -0,57 0,45
trend in internal conflict -0,05443 0,676998 -3 1,541667
trend in bureaucratic quality -0,01907 0,0797711 -0,45833 0,458333
trend in political stability -0,02378 0,2519683 -1 1
aid over GNI at t-1 0,086542 0,0842487 0,001071 0,71553
share of aid as BS at t-1 0,054427 0,0785527 0 0,841463
log of recipient GDP/cap 6,859313 0,6335308 5,22197 9,142426
log of recipient population 16,9152 0,8043003 14,15416 18,83419
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